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ABSTRACT
DISTRIBUTED PORT SCANNING DETECTION
by Himanshu Singh
Conventional Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) have heavyweight
processing and memory requirements as they maintain per ﬂow state using data
structures like linked lists or trees. This is required for some specialized jobs such as
Stateful Packet Inspection (SPI) where the network communications between entities
are recreated in its entirety to inspect application level data. The downside to this
approach is that the NIDS must be in a position to view all inbound and outbound
traﬃc of the protected network. The NIDS can be overwhelmed by a DDoS attack
since most of these try and exhaust the available state of network entities. For some
applications like port scan detection, we do not require to reconstruct the complete
network traﬃc. We propose to integrate a detector into all routers so that a more
distributed detection approach can be achieved. Since routers are devices with limited
memory and processing capabilities, conventional NIDS approaches do not work while
integrating a detector in them. We describe a method to detect port scans using
aggregation. A data structure called a Partial Completion Filter(PCF) or a counting
Bloom ﬁlter is used to reduce the per ﬂow state.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Scanning activity is regarded to be a threat by the security community - an
indicator of an imminent attack. Panjwani et al found that 50% of all scanning
activity was followed by an attack[16].
Incidents of computer break in and sensitive information being compromised are
fairly common. There are substantial ﬁnancial gains to be made from electronic theft
of data . Utility providers using information technology for eﬃcient management of
resources across increasingly greater regions are vulnerable to service disruption by
electronic sabotage of their centralized systems[15].
Attack programs search for openings in a network, much as a thief
tests locks on doors. Once inside, these programs and their human
controllers can acquire the same access and powers as a systems
administrator[10].
Government computers were the target of an espionage network which compromised
thousands of oﬃcial systems worldwide [7]. The attacker with the greatest technical
sophistication is the professional criminal or the cyber terrorist. A sophisticated
adversary is risk averse and may go to great lengths to hide their tracks[1]. This
is because detection may provoke a response by the defender  either retaliation or
up gradation of the defenses. One of the tactics used in warfare is reconnaissance
2or information gathering. Reconnaissance can be non technical - social engineering,
dumpster diving or technical  scanning the target's network, monitoring traﬃc[21].
The method of determining services available on a computer by sending packets
to several ports is called port scanning[8]. Further communication on the ports that
services are available can determine the vulnerability to any available exploit and
is termed vulnerability scanning. The scanning packets traverse the target network
and so are visible to any network application such as an Intrusion Detection System
(IDS). This may cause them to be detected. Avoiding detection by IDS can be as
simple as insertion of a time delay between scanning packets, thereby defeating most
thresholding based IDS algorithms. However this is not eﬃcient as it slows down
the scanning activity. For a more eﬃcient approach, other methods have evolved like
coordinated / distributed port scans. These divide the target space among multiple
Source IPs (SIPs) such that each SIP scans a portion of the target. The IDS may
not detect this activity due to the small number of connection attempts, or if it does,
then it may not be able to detect the collaboration between the source machines.
Early detection and reaction to potential intruders is made possible by the
detection of port scans, stealthy or co-ordinated port scans. Cohen [5] determines
optimal defender strategies by simulating computer attacks and defences. He ﬁnds
that responding quickly to an attack is the best strategy that a defender can employ.
A quick response is better than having a highly skilled and multilevel defence in place,
but an increased response time to an attack.
1.1 Scalable port scan detection
In a nutshell, we would like to use aggregation techniques to scalably detect
distributed port scanning activity by fast spreading Internet worms and validate the
3detector using a simulator[24]
1.2 Overview of the report
Chapter 2 is a primer on types of scans and detectors. In Chapter 3 we present
our motivation and related work in port scan detection. Chapter 4 introduces the
detector that we have built. Chapter 5 is an analysis of the data generated by the
simulation of the detection algorithm. Our conclusion is presented in Chapter 6.
4Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
Port scanning is a method of determining the available services on a computer
by sending packets. It is generally viewed as a reconnaissance activity or information
gathering phase distinct from the attack phase. This implies that there will be a gap
between the scan and the attack. But there are no technical reasons for separating
the reconnaissance activity with the attack phase when fast propagation is a key
consideration. This can be achieved with an integrated scan and exploit tool. There is
a trade oﬀ between between speed and stealth of the scanning activity. The motivation
of the attacker dictates the choice between speed and stealth. Fast propagation is a
kind of brute force scan/attack and is easily detected by the target network security
personnel. Some scanning activity is immediately followed by an attack. This is
probably to take advantage of zero day exploits.
2.1 Port scanning
A listening service on a network host is referenced by the combination of its
host IP address and the bound port number. A port is a logical address on a machine.
There are 65,536 TCP and 65,536 UDP ports on a machine. These are split into three
ranges by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)[18] :
5(1) Well Known Ports, from 0 through 1023
(2) Registered Ports, from 1024 through 49151
(3) Dynamic and/or Private Ports, from 49152 through 65535
Port Scanning is the process of identifying some or all open ports
(listening services) on one or more hosts.[14]
A port scan may be the precursor to an actual attack, so it is essential for the network
administrator to be able to detect it when it occurs.
A simple port scan by itself does not harm the host as it concentrates on the
Well Known Ports, and is done in a sequential manner. If, on the other hand, enough
such simultaneous connect attempts are made, the host's resources may get exhausted
and its performance adversely aﬀected, as the connection state has to be maintained.
Clearly, this can be used as a Denial Of Service (DOS) attack.
In order to detect and prevent port scanning, various Intrusion Detection/Pre-
vention System (IDS/IPS) are used. IDS/IPS identiﬁes multiple connection requests
on diﬀerent ports from a single host and automatically blocks the corresponding IP
address. The best example of this kind of IDS/IPS is Snort [14]. Distributed port
scanning is used to evade detection and avoid the corresponding black listing of the
source machine by the target host/network.
A conventional port scan targets a single or a few chosen hosts,with a limited
subset of carefully chosen ports. This type of scan is slow and and generally used on
pre chosen targets, so its IP coverage focus is narrow. A speciﬁc type of port scan
called a sweep targets whole IP ranges, but only one or two ports. Here the objective
is to quickly cover as many hosts as possible, so its IP coverage focus is broad. This
sweep behavior is generally exhibited by a worm or an attacker looking for a speciﬁc
vulnerable service.
62.2 Classiﬁcation of scans
Scans can be classiﬁed by their footprint which is nothing but the set of IP/port
combinations that is the focus of the attacker. The footprint is independent of how
the scan was conducted or the script of the scan [22]. Staniford et al note that
the most common footprint is a horizontal scan. They infer that this is due to the
attacker being in possession of an exploit and interested in any hosts which expose
that service. This footprint results in a scan which covers the port of interest across
all IP addresses within a range. Horizontal scans may also be indicative of a network
mapping attempt to ﬁnd available hosts in a range of IP addresses. Scans on some or
all ports of a single host are termed vertical scans. The target is more speciﬁc here
and the purpose is to ﬁnd out if the host exposes any service with an existing exploit.
A combination of horizontal and vertical scans is termed a block scan of multiple
services on multiple hosts [22].
Figure 2.1: Conceptual geometric pattern of common scan footprints [9]
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MOTIVATION
We developed a distributed port scanner which used proxy response ﬁngerprint-
ing based on a presentation at the RSA 2006 conference [14]. We used the free open
application proxy Squid [6] as the intermediary and implemented the scanner in Perl.
3.1 Design considerations
There are a lot of variables that require careful consideration while designing a
detector. We make the following assumptions about the operating conditions of the
detector
• A medium to large size network with multiple gateways and quite possibly
delegated administrative authority.
• The core network administrators require fast detection and logging of any
distributed scanning activity. However, there will be no automated response
to any ﬂagged scanning activity. (No auto ban or blacklisting) The ﬂagged
activity details will be handed over to the administrators of the aﬀected net-
works. This will avoid issues like blocking traﬃc from legitimate IP addresses
due to spooﬁng of their IP addresses by the scanners. This kind of Denial of
Service (DoS) can theoretically be prevented by a white-list, but it requires
a substantial administrative overhead to maintain.
8• The amount of network data captured or stored for consumption by the de-
tector must be substantially smaller than the original.
Considering the above operating conditions the detector characteristics can be ob-
tained
• It operates on packet level summaries.
• It operates in real time as it has access to all the required packet summaries
immediately. Flow level data can only be obtained when the ﬂow is ﬁnished
and the information is purged to storage. This can take a long time as the
ﬂows duration varies greatly. This forces any detector based on ﬂow level
data to be non real time.
• It is stateless in nature. Inspecting application level data requires the storage
of complete packets and their reassembly requiring the detector to maintain
state. We do not require storage or reassembly of packets as we just need the
summaries. We can see that the storage requirements for these summaries is
based on the volume of packets. A way to decouple the storage requirements
with the traﬃc volume is to use aggregation.
3.2 Related work
Network Security Monitor (NSM) [11] was the pioneering NIDS. Its scan detec-
tion rules detected any source IP address which attempted to connect more than 15
hosts. Time is not mentioned as a factor in the paper. Since then, most NIDS use a
variant of this thresholding algorithm.
Snort has a preprocessor for detecting port scans based on invalid ﬂag combi-
nations or exceeding a preset threshold. Scans which abuse the TCP protocol like
9NULL scans, Xmas tree scans and SYN-FIN scans can be detected by their invalid
TCP ﬂag combinations. Scans which use valid ﬂags can be detected by a threshold
mechanism. Snort is conﬁgured by default to generate an alarm only if it detects a
single host sending SYN packets to four diﬀerent ports in less than three seconds [19].
Bro also uses thresholding to detect scans [17]. A single source attempting to
contact multiple destination IP addresses is considered a scanner if the number of
destinations exceeds a preset threshold. A vertical scan is ﬂagged by a single source
contacting more than the threshold number of destination ports. Paxson indicates
that this method generates false positives, such as a single source client contacting
multiple internal web servers. To reduce the number of false positives, Bro uses packet
and payload information for application level analysis.
Staniford et al use simulated annealing to detect stealthy and distributed port
scans [22]. Packets are initially pre-processed by Spade which ﬂags packets as normal
or anomalous. Spice uses the packets ﬂagged as anomalous and places them in a
graph, with connections formed using simulated annealing. Packets which are most
similar to each other are grouped together. This approach is used in the detection of
port scans.
Threshold RandomWalk (TRW) developed by Jung et al requires information if
a particular host and service are available on the target network [12]. This information
is obtained by analysis of return traﬃc or through an oracle. They apply sequential
hypothesis testing on new connection requests that arrive to determine whether a
source is performing a scan. The assumption is that a destination is more likely
to respond with a SYN-ACK to a benign source (legitimate connection requests are
generally from clients who are aware of the services that exist on the destination),
than to a scanner source.
Kompella et al focus on scalable attack detection by aggregating the per ﬂow
10
state into a data structure they call a Partial Completion Filter (PCF) [13]. The
PCF data structure is similar to a counting Bloom ﬁlter [3][4]. State can be evicted
from the PCF unlike Bloom ﬁlters where this is not possible.
11
Chapter 4
APPROACH
4.1 Simulation environment
We selected OMNeT++ [25][24]as the simulation environment. OMNeT++
is a discrete event simulator with support for network simulation using the INET
framework [23].
There is a distinct separation of form/structure and function/behavior in the
OMNeT++ simulator. Simulations are made up of modules. There are two types
of modules: simple and compound. A simple module is comprised of its structure
(deﬁned in the NED programming language) which is nothing but a container with
gates or connections with which it communicates with other modules. The behavior
of a simple module is deﬁned by its C++ implementation .
Figure 4.1: Simple and compound modules
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4.2 TCP Scanner
TCP has a very complex state diagram (see Figure 4.2 on page 13). The set
up of a TCP connection requires a 3-way handshake. The listening application is
informed only when the handshake is successful [8].
There are several types of TCP scanning methods used in the ﬁeld [8]
• TCP connect() scanning
• TCP SYN (half open) scanning
• TCP FIN (stealth) scanning
• Xmas and Null scans
• ACK and Window scans
• RST scans
A TCP connect() scan completes the 3-way handshake and is logged as a connection
attempt by the application. This scan is the easy to implement and does not require
root priviliges. The port is considered open when the connection is established and
closed if the connection attempt fails. The scanner sends a SYN packet, receives a
SYN-ACK to acknowledge the connection, followed by an ACK by the scanner to
complete the connection setup. The connection is then torn down by a FIN from the
scanner. This method is only used in port scanning when the scan is run as a normal
user. The more typical usage is to probe the application level service version as part
of a vulnerability scan.
A TCP SYN (half open) scan is the most popular type of port scan when root
priviliges are possible. The scan does not show up in the application level logs since
13
Figure 4.2: TCP State diagram [20]
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the 3-way TCP handshake is not completed. Its stops the TCP connection open
process midway after the ﬁrst reponse from the server so is know as the half open
scan. The scanner sends a SYN packet to the target. If the response is a SYN-ACK,
the port is open. A closed port causes the target OS to respond with a RST-ACK.
If the reponse received was SYN-ACK, the scanner responds with a RST to abort
the connection. The advantage of this method is that scan leaves no trace in the
application level service logs.
If there is no response from the target port, the port could be ﬁltered, which
means that a ﬁrewall is dropping all SYN-ACK packets to the closed port. If that is
the case then the FIN scan can be used. The ﬁrewall rule set will generally allow all
inbound packets with a FIN to pass through without exception. When the scanner
sends a FIN packet to a closed port, then the response will be a RST. If the port is
open then there will be no response received.
There are several variations of the FIN scan. In a Xmas scan, the URG, PSH
and FIN ﬂags are set. In a Null scan, none of the ﬂags are set. In both cases the
sequence number is 0.
ACK scans are used to determine which ports are ﬁltered by the ﬁrewall by
sending a packet to a port with only the ACK ﬂag set. A RST reponse indicates that
the port is unﬁltered and is accessible remotely. If no response is received or if an
ICMP unreachable response is recieved then the port is ﬁltered by the ﬁrewall.
We implemented a distributed TCP port scanner in the OMNet++ simulation
environment. The scanner supports the TCP SYN (half open) type of scan. The
algorithm of the scanner is shown in 4.1.
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Algorithm 4.1 TCP scanner
Input : Number o f scanner s n
Input : L i s t o f IP/ port pa i r s P
f o r every scanner
portsPerScanner = |P | / | n |
whi l e portsPerScanner > 0 do
send SYN
i f recv (SYN+ACK) then
port OPEN
send RST
end i f
i f r ecv (SYN+RST) then
port CLOSED
end i f
i f r ecv (TIMEOUT) then
port FILTERED
end i f
portsPerScanner = portsPerScanner − 1
end whi l e
4.3 Packet sniﬀer
Speciﬁc packet ﬁelds serve as an input to the IDS for generation of the packet
summary information. We require the following ﬁelds from every incoming IP packet
on all the router interfaces..
(1) Source IP (SIP)
(2) Destination IP (DIP)
(3) Source Port (SP)
(4) Destination Port (DP)
(5) SYN
(6) FIN
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(7) ACK
(8) RST
We can extract the SIP and the DIP from the IP packet header (see Figure 4.3 on
page 17). The other ﬁelds are from the encapsulated TCP packet header (see Figure
4.4 on page 18).
Type Range Field Abv. Extracted from
IPaddress 0.0.0.0 - 255.255.255.255 Source IP SIP IP
IPaddress 0.0.0.0 - 255.255.255.255 Destination IP DIP IP
Numeric 0 - 65535 Source Port SP TCP
Numeric 0 - 65535 Destination Port DP TCP
Flag boolean Synchronize SYN TCP
Flag boolean Acknowledgement ACK TCP
Flag boolean Finish FIN TCP
Flag boolean Reset RST TCP
Table 4.1: Fields extracted by the packet sniﬀer
The packet sniﬀer is notiﬁed whenever there is an incoming packet on any
interface. It is programmed only to extract the required header ﬁelds (see Table 4.1
on page 16) even though the sniﬀer has complete access to the packet header and
payload information (sniﬀer operates in priviliged or root mode, which allows it to
hook into the Operating System (OS) TCP/IP stack).
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Figure 4.3: IP v4 header [2]
The TCP information is encapsulated within the IPv4 payload. We just peek
at the required ﬁelds by making a temporary copy of the original IPv4 packet and
de-encapsulating it to extract the required TCP ﬁelds. The ﬁelds are then converted
to a text format ready to be pushed to detector mechanism.
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Figure 4.4: TCP header [2]
4.4 Detector
The detector is designed to be strapped on to router ﬁrmware. This design
choice dictates that the detector must have the following characteristics:
(1) Should NOT be processor intensive.
(2) Very low and predictable memory requirements.
In other words the prime function of a router is packet forwarding and any included
Intrusion Detection Sytem (IDS) functionality should scale gracefully and not cause
the primary functionality to fail. The emphasis is on realtime detection which means
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that processing speed is one of the design goals. We are willing to sacriﬁce accuracy
to some extent to achieve this goal.
Figure 4.5: Prototype IDS within router r3
The IDS integrated within a router is shown in Figure 4.5 on page 19. The
packet sniﬀer and the detector can be seen in the router. Whenever a packet arrives
on a router interface, a lookup of the routing table is performed to determine the next
hop if the destination is not local. After the route lookup, the TTL is decremented
and the packet is forwarded on the corresponding interface for the particular route.
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4.4.1 Patterns in TCP packet traﬃc
The pattern of benign and TCP scan traﬃc is diﬀerent. Our scan detection
algorithm uses these diﬀerences to ﬂag a particular set of packets as scanners or
benign
Symmetry in benign TCP connections
TCP has an elaborate setup and a teardown process. A benign connection will
look like the following to an observer of the communication between the client and
the server:
TCP (SETUP )
~ww←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→SessionEstablishedwwTCP(TEARDOWN)
We can see that there are three diﬀerent stages:
(1) Setup: This is the TCP 3-way handshake.
(a) SYN
(b) SYN-ACK
(c) ACK
(2) Session Established: The period during which the client will communicate
with the server. An example would be to fetch a page from a web server.
(3) Teardown: This is when the FIN packet is used to bring down the connection
Asymmetry in TCP scan traﬃc
We take the TCP SYN (half open) scanning into consideration. The traﬃc
between an scanner and a server will look like the following to an observer who is in
a position to observer both sides of the communication.
TCP (OPEN)
~ww−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→HandshakeAbortedwwTCP(ABORT )
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(1) Open: This is the standard TCP 3-way handshake till 1b. Then in 1c the
scanner aborts the handshake.
(a) SYN
(b) SYN-ACK
(c) RST
(2) Handshake Aborted: The session was not able to setup as the RST from the
scanner aborted the TCP 3-way handshake
(3) Abort: This is when the RST packet aborts the handshake. There is no FIN
packet associated with the abort process.
4.4.2 Partial Completion Filter (PCF)
The Partial Completion Filter (PCF) was introduced by Kompella et al. [13].
It is similar to a counting Bloom ﬁlter. There are multiple parallel stages in a PCF
with each stage containing hash buckets that hold a counter (see Figure 4.6 on page
22). The hash bucket counter in scope is incremented for a SYN and decremented
for a FIN. For benign TCP connections the symmetry between the SYNs and FINs
will ensure that the counter will tend towards 0. If an IP address hashes into buckets
which have large counter values in all stages, then we can assert with a high degree
of conﬁdence that the IP address is involved in a scan.
4.5 Network Topology
The prototype IDS is deployed on a /16 CIDR [26] within the OMNeT++
simulator. The number of scanners and target servers are variable. There is also a
provision to add other hosts which can generate background traﬃc.
22
Figure 4.6: Multiple stage Partial Completion Filter [13]
23
Figure 4.7: Port scan experimental setup in OMNeT++ with 2 scanners, 2 targets,
and no background traﬃc.
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Chapter 5
RESULTS
We used an experimental setup with the following conﬁguration.
• Two scanners, two regular routers, one router with the IDS system, and two
targets (Figure 5.1 on page 24). The threshold chosen was 3.
Figure 5.1: Experiment setup with two scanners and two targets
The results are shown in Table 5.1 on page 25.
• Four scanners, two regular routers, one router with the IDS system, and two
targets (Figure 5.2 on page 26). The threshold chosen was 3.
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The results are shown in Table 5.2 on page 27.
Figure 5.2: Experiment setup with four scanners and two targets
We measure the detection rate as the number of scanner IPs that the detector
could identify. The results of both these setups are unusual in that they are constant
for a wide variation of parameters. The only parameter which has a signiﬁcant eﬀect
is the threshold. Any scanner that operates below the currently set threshold is
mislabelled. Since the amount of traﬃc generated in the network is limited, it remains
to be seen whether this behavior manifests itself in scaled up simulations or actual
network traces.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
Conventional Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) have heavyweight
processing and memory requirements as they maintain per ﬂow state using data
structures like linked lists or trees. This is required for some specialized jobs such as
Stateful Packet Inspection (SPI) where the network communications between entities
are recreated in its entirety to inspect application level data. The downside to this
approach is that:
• The NIDS must be in a position to view all inbound and outbound traﬃc of
the protected network
• The NIDS can be overwhelmed by a DDoS attack since most of these try and
exhaust the available state of network entities.
For some applications like port scan detection, we do not require to reconstruct the
complete network traﬃc. We can see that the aggregation approach works well, some-
what like a set lookup with a very compact storage mechanism. The data structure
is unique in following respects:
(1) The values stored cannot be retreived verbatim or enumerated.
(2) An input value can be tested for prior existance among the set of values
stored.
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These properties listed above are used in reducing the detector state to a constant
value. Since routers are devices with limited memory and processing capabilities,
these properties ﬁt in exceedingly well with our requirements of ﬁtting a detection
mechanism into them.
Gaming the detector system can be attempted in the forward path by sending
spurious client generated FINs. This can be countered by eliminating client FINs
from the equation. The spurious FIN technique is not possible in the reverse path as
the server would have to terminate the connection.
Future work includes incorporating the detector into multiple routers and for-
mulating a peer to peer or client server distributed detector communication network.
A distributed set look up is then possible from any point in the network. So routers in
various segments can be queried like a directory to check whether a particular packet
was forwarded by them.
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NOMENCLATURE
ACK TCP ACKnowledge ﬂag
DIP Destination IP
DP Destination Port
FIN TCP FINish ﬂag
HIDS Host-based Intrusion Detection System
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IP Internet Protocol
NIDS Network Intrusion Detection System
OS Operating System
PCF Partial Completion Filter
SIP Source IP
SP Source Port
SYN TCP SYNchronize ﬂag
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
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